A Shahed-136 drone is displayed at a rally in western Tehran, Iran, on February 11, 2026.
Nurphoto | Nurphoto | Getty Images
In the aftermath of the Israeli-U.S. strikes on Iran, American allies in the Persian Gulf are hearing a sound that Ukrainian soldiers have long come to dread: the foreboding hum of the Shahed-136 ‘kamikaze’ drone.
Originating from Iran, the Shahed has already become a fixture of modern warfare, with Tehran’s strategic partner, Russia, utilizing the technology in its years-long invasion of Ukraine.
Now, the drones — the most advanced of which is the long-ranged Shahed-136 — have become central to Iran’s retaliation strategy against the U.S. and its regional allies, with thousands unleashed so far.
At first glance, the Shahed is unremarkable compared with cutting-edge weapon technologies, with one analyst referring to it as “the poor man’s cruise missile.”
But while American allies have managed to intercept the vast majority of incoming drones with the help of U.S.-provided defense systems such as the ‘Patriot’ missiles, many Shaheds still managed to hit their targets.
The United Arab Emirates Ministry of Defence said on Tuesday that out of 941 Iranian drones detected since the start of the Iran war, 65 fell within its territory, damaging ports, airports, hotels and data centers.
The Shahed‑136, among other unmanned aerial systems, has allowed states like Russia and Iran a cheap way to impose disproportionate costs.
Patrycja Bazylczyk
Analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studie
Analysts say the key to their effectiveness lies in the numbers. The drones are relatively cheap and easy to mass-produce, especially compared to the sophisticated systems used to defend against them.
Those factors make the drone ideal for swarming and overburdening aerial defenses, with each drone intercepted also representing a more valuable defense asset expended.
“The Shahed‑136, among other unmanned aerial systems, has allowed states like Russia and Iran a cheap way to impose disproportionate costs,” said Patrycja Bazylczyk, analyst with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC.
“They force adversaries to waste expensive interceptors on low‑cost drones, project power, and create a steady psychological burden on civilian populations.”
The cost imbalance
U.S. government reports describe the Shahed-136 as a one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle produced by Iranian entities tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Compared with ballistic missiles, the drones fly low and slow, deliver a relatively modest payload, and are limited to mostly fixed targets, said Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior director of the Iran program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told CNBC.
Public estimates suggest Shahed drones can cost between $20,000 and $50,000 apiece. Ballistic and cruise missiles, by contrast, can cost millions of dollars each.
In that sense, the Shahed and its equivalents “basically serve as ‘the poor man’s cruise missile’ offering a way to strike and harass adversaries “on the cheap,” said Taleblu.
For Iran, which faces both international sanctions and limitations on acquiring advanced weapons, that cost advantage is significant.
Meanwhile, air defense systems used by Gulf states and Israel can cost between $3 million and $12 million per interceptor, according to U.S. Department of Defense budget documents.
This cost discrepancy raises a serious issue for Iran’s enemies: Air defense systems have finite numbers of defense missiles, with each target intercepted representing a valuable asset expended.
Pimary technical data from the U.S. Army’s ODIN database and Iranian military disclosures describe the Shahed-136 as about 3.5 metres long with a 2.5-metre wingspan.
Sergei Supinsky | Afp | Getty Images
Thus, in a war of attrition, the drones could be used by Tehran to wear down air defenses, opening them up to more damaging attacks, analysts say.
“The logic is to expend drones early while preserving ballistic missiles for the long haul,” said CSIS’s Bazylczyk.
She added that Iran’s ability to sustain mass‑drone use will depend on its stockpiles, how well it can protect or restore its supply chain, and whether the U.S. and Israel can meaningfully disrupt the flow of components or production sites.
The U.S. has long sought to disrupt Iran’s production of the Shahed-136, and recently imposed new sanctions targeting suspected component suppliers across Turkey and the UAE.
However, Russia’s production of Shahed drones shows that such systems can be manufactured at scale during wartime and amid targeted sanctions.
U.S. officials claim Iran had launched over 2,000 drones in the conflict as of Wednesday. However, the country is understood to have large stockpiles and may be capable of producing hundreds more each week, military experts reportedly told The National newspaper.
“Gulf countries are at risk of depleting their interceptors unless they are more prudent about when it fires those interceptors,” said Joze Pelayo, a Middle East security analyst with the think tank Atlantic Council.
“The depletion is not imminent, but it remains an urgent issue,” he said, noting. However, attacks on multiple fronts by Iranian allies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis could put stockpiles at risk of being depleted within days, he added.
A new staple of the modern battlefield?
The Shahed‑136 was first unveiled around 2021 and gained global attention after Russia began deploying the Iranian-supplied weapons during its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
The Kremlin has since received thousands of the drones and begun producing them based on Iranian designs, highlighting their reproducible and scalable design.
Some analysts have suggested that Iran has drawn from Russia’s extensive battlefield experience with the drones, including modifications such as anti-jamming antennas, electronic warfare-resistant navigation, and new warheads.
Those warheads typically carry 30 kg to 50 kg of explosives and can pack a punch, particularly when used in large swarms, with advanced versions capable of a range of up to 1,200 miles.
Michael Connell, a Middle East specialist at the Center for Naval Analyses, said that the Shahed-136 has proven so effective that the U.S. has reverse-engineered it and deployed its own version on the battlefield against Iranian targets.
In its Iran attacks over the weekend, the U.S. Central Command confirmed that it had used such low-cost one-way attack drones modeled after the Shahed for the first time in combat.
With drones becoming a fixture of the modern battlefield, methods for dealing with them are also evolving.
According to Taleblu from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Ukraine has found some success in downing drones with fighter jet cannon fire, a more sustainable deterrent than missile interceptors.
Ukraine also recently pioneered the development of cheaper mass-produced interceptors, which Kyiv claims can stop the Shahed.
Gulf states are also expected to adopt more sustainable approaches. The Pentagon and at least one Gulf government are reportedly in talks to buy the cheaper Ukrainian-made interceptors.
Meanwhile, Qatar’s Ministry of Defense says it is also using its air force jets to intercept Iranian attacks, including Shahed drones, alongside ground-based air defenses.
Electronic warfare targeting the Shahed’s GPS, as well as short-range missiles and directed-energy systems such as Israel’s Iron Beam, are also significantly cheaper to operate than traditional interceptors.
Still, analysts say Gulf states currently lack fast, high-volume anti-drone capabilities. Developing and deploying such systems will likely take years, said Atlantic Council’s Pelayo.
“Countries in the Gulf hosting U.S. bases, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE, benefit from an extended ability to repel drone attacks through the American-operated system, but it is still not enough against mass and sustained attacks.”
